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I. INTRODUCTION 
The American juvenile justice system was first established in 1825 
when the Society for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency created the 
New York House of Refuge to house and rehabilitate troubled youth.1  
Juvenile offenders stayed at “reform schools,” like the New York House 
of Refuge.2  These reform schools sought to rehabilitate juvenile 
offenders, as well as protect them from adult criminal offenders.3  Cook 
County, Illinois established the first juvenile court in 1899, and by 1924, 
most states had established juvenile court systems.4  These early juvenile 
court systems were premised on the parens patriae doctrine, emphasizing 
“an informal, nonadversarial, and flexible approach to cases[,]” and the 
paramount goal of the juvenile courts was to rehabilitate the juvenile 
offenders.5  This was accomplished in part by housing juvenile offenders 
in reform schools, separated from adult criminal offenders.6 
In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court recognized that juvenile 
offenders have the same constitutional rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause as their adult counterparts.7  Beginning 
                                                                                                                       
 1 See ABA Div. for Pub. Educ., The History of Juvenile Justice, at 5 (Apr. 9, 2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authc
heckdam.pdf; 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (2016) (defining “juvenile” as a person who is under 
eighteen years old).  This Author will use “juvenile” and “adolescent” interchangeably 
throughout this Comment. 
 2 ABA Div. for Pub. Educ., supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See id. (defining parens patriae as the state’s “power to serve as a guardian (or 
parent) for those with legal disabilities, including juveniles”). 
 6 See id. 
 7 See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 8 
(Harvard Univ. Press) (paperback ed. 2010); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55–
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in the 1970s and continuing through the early 1990s, juvenile crime, 
specifically violent crime, increased, as did a desire for a more punitive 
juvenile system.8  Critics of the rehabilitative juvenile justice model 
demanded reform; as a result, more juveniles, considered by some 
criminologists to be “super-predators,”9 were transferred to the adult 
criminal system.10  Juvenile arrest rates began to decline in 1996 and have 
been steadily declining since 2006.11  In addition, the notion that juvenile 
offenders are “super-predators” has faded.12  Moreover, recent legislative 
and policy reforms in numerous states as well as Supreme Court decisions 
such as Roper v. Simmons, which abolished the juvenile death penalty, 
indicate a movement away from such harsh treatment of juvenile 
offenders.13 
While the juvenile justice system has evolved and fluctuated in 
significant ways since its inception, one principle remains constant: 
“children are different.”14  In 2015, the Third Circuit ignored this 
fundamental truth when it held in J.B. v. Fassnacht that juvenile detention 
centers may impose a blanket strip search policy upon all juvenile 
detainees entering the general population.15  The Third Circuit referred 
extensively to the Supreme Court’s decision in Florence v. Board of 
                                                                                                                       
57 (1967) (holding that juvenile offenders have a constitutional right to sufficient notice of 
charges, notification of right to counsel, adequate safeguards against self-incrimination, 
and confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses). 
 8 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 6–9, 84 (noting a period of “‘moral panic’ 
in which politicians, the public, and the media respond[ed] on the basis of exaggerated 
perceptions of threat” even during the mid-1990s when juvenile crime began to decline); 
see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the 
Regulation of Youth Crime, 18:2 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 17–18 (2008) (noting states 
enacted “automatic transfer statutes, under which many youths [were] categorically treated 
as adults when they [were] charged with crimes—either generally . . . or for specific 
crimes . . . ”) (internal citation omitted). 
 9 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 6 n.12. 
 10 See id. at 5–9, 94–96. 
 11 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILE ARREST RATE TRENDS, 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05200 (noting that juvenile 
arrest rates for all offenses have declined by seventy percent since 1996). 
 12 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 11. 
 13 Id. at 11–13. See also 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
 14 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480–81 (2012) (referring to juveniles).  See also 
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 29 (arguing that “scientific knowledge about 
cognitive, psychosocial, and neurobiological development in adolescents supports the 
conclusion that juveniles are different from adults in fundamental ways that bear on 
decisions about their appropriate treatment within the justice system—and that this 
scientific knowledge should be the foundation of the legal regulation of juvenile crime”) 
(emphasis added). 
 15 801 F.3d 336, 337, 341 (3d Cir. 2015) (Fuentes, Nygaard & Roth, JJ.), cert. denied, 
2016 U.S. LEXIS 2036 (Mar. 21, 2016) (No. 15-903). 
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Chosen Freeholders, which held that a correctional facility may enforce a 
universal strip search policy on all detainees entering the general 
population.16  “Using Florence as a guidepost,” the Third Circuit noted 
that the Florence Court did not carve out an exception for juvenile 
detainees, and the institutional security risks at an adult jail are the same 
as those at juvenile detention center.17  Thus, the Third Circuit determined 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Florence governed strip searches of 
juvenile detainees at juvenile detention centers.18  By doing so, the Third 
Circuit treated juveniles as “miniature adults.”19 
The Third Circuit incorrectly decided J.B. v. Fassnacht in three 
significant ways.  First, the Third Circuit failed to meaningfully consider 
the psychological and developmental factors that distinguish juveniles 
from adults, as well as Supreme Court precedent which found age a 
determinative factor in assessing culpability.  Second, the Third Circuit 
incorrectly found that the risks and dangers presented at adult jails are the 
same as those presented at juvenile facilities, implying that juveniles are 
miniature adults.  Finally, the Third Circuit improperly held that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Florence governed the issue.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Safford United School District #1 v. Redding sets forth 
the applicable precedent for searches of juveniles, requiring an 
individualized determination standard, instead of Florence’s categorical 
rule.20  As provided in Safford, there must be an individualized, reasonable 
suspicion that a juvenile detainee is dangerous or hiding contraband before 
a correctional officer may conduct a strip search. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the Third Circuit’s decision and 
reasoning in J.B. v. Fassnacht.  Part III of this Comment will address the 
relevant Supreme Court precedent.  Part IV will argue that the Third 
Circuit incorrectly decided J.B. v. Fassnacht.  Part V will contend that an 
individualized, reasonable suspicion standard, as set forth in Safford, in 
the context of juvenile detention center strip searches, is more aligned with 
traditional Fourth Amendment principles, and more appropriate, than the 
administrative search policy provided in Florence.  Part VI briefly 
concludes. 
                                                                                                                       
 16 Id. at 339–47.  See also 566 U.S. 318, 322–23 (2012). 
 17 See Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 342–43, 346–47. 
 18 Id. at 337, 341. 
 19 Miller, 567 U.S. at 481 (noting that historically, laws and the judiciary have 
recognized that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 20 See 557 U.S. 364, 370, 377 (2009). 
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II. J.B. V. FASSNACHT AND UNIVERSAL STRIP SEARCHES IN 
JUVENILE DETENTION CENTERS 
J.B. was twelve years old when he created a homemade flame 
thrower with a “PVC pipe, a lighter, and some spray paint.”21  The one to 
two-foot flames attracted some neighborhood girls, whose babysitter told 
J.B. to stop playing with the object.22  The girls later approached J.B. and 
teased him.23  A fight ensued, and J.B. held a homemade knife over a girl’s 
head and said he could kill her.24  A parent called a police officer to the 
incident, and a juvenile allegation of “terroristic threats and summary 
harassment” was filed three weeks later.25  J.B. was subsequently detained 
at the Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center (“LCYIC”) because 
the charges were serious.26  When he arrived at LCYIC, J.B. was processed 
and strip searched under facility policy.27  An officer led J.B. to the shower 
area, closed a privacy curtain and told J.B. to “drop his pants and 
underwear, bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough.”28  J.B. was 
exposed to the officer for approximately ninety seconds.29  LCYIC 
detained J.B. for approximately four days before releasing him to his 
parents.30  At his juvenile hearing, J.B. did not contest the charges against 
him, and he agreed to write an apology letter to the victims and to abide 
by his probation conditions.31  In exchange, his record would be 
expunged.32 
                                                                                                                       
 21 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 337. 
 22 Id.  See also Brief for Appellees at 5, J.B. v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(No. 14-3905), 2015 WL 1606873, at *5 (noting “[t]he girls started teasing J.B., and there 
was some name calling among the children.”); Brief and Appendix for Appellants at 11, 
J.B. v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3905), 2015 WL 502836, at *11 
(noting “[l]ater that day, the same girls came to the J.B.’s front yard and began teasing J.B. 
which led to a hand-to-hand fighting between him and at least two of the girls . . . ”). 
 23 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 337. 
 24 Id. at 337–38 (noting that J.B. told the girl “he was stronger than her, ‘so [he could] 
kill [her] and over power [her].’”) (alteration in original).  See also Brief for Appellees, 
supra note 22, at 5 (noting that J.B. held the knife “over the head of another playmate . . . in 
a joking manner.”). 
 25 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 338.  See also Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at 6 (noting 
that the responding police officer informed J.B.’s father that a father of one of the girls 
wished to file charges, and after his [the officer’s] vacation, “he would look into it”). 
 26 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 338. 
 27 Id. (“This policy states that such searches are conducted to look for signs of ‘injuries, 
markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.’”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 338. 
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J.B.’s parents sued the police officers, Lancaster County Office of 
Juvenile Probation officials, and LCYIC officials on his behalf, alleging, 
among other things, unreasonable search and seizure.33  The defendants 
argued that this allegation failed under Florence v. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders.34  The District Court rejected the defendants’ argument and 
held that Florence did not apply to juvenile detainees, as it only addressed 
strip searches of adult inmates.35  Concerned by the three-week gap 
between the incident and J.B.’s detention, the District Court reasoned that 
there was a “genuine issue of material fact” whether the correctional 
officers had “reasonable suspicion to strip search J.B[.]”36  The District 
Court certified to the Third Circuit the question of “whether Florence 
applies to all juveniles being committed to a juvenile detention facility.”37 
On appeal, J.B.’s parents argued that Florence is limited to adult 
detainees.38  J.B.’s parents argued that Safford United School District #1 
v. Redding governs searches of juveniles; therefore, a correctional officer 
must have an individualized, reasonable suspicion to believe a juvenile 
detainee is concealing contraband, before conducting a strip search.39  
Finding that Safford only governed strip searches of juveniles in schools, 
the Third Circuit rejected J.B.’s argument, holding that Florence applies 
to all juvenile detainees entering a juvenile detention center’s general 
population.40  The Third Circuit reasoned that the three institutional 
security risks the Supreme Court identified in Florence applied to juvenile 
detention centers.41  A universal strip search policy “make[s] good sense” 
because (1) new detainees could introduce lice or contagious infections to 
the general population; (2) an increased number of gang members going 
through the intake process increases the likelihood of violence in the 
facility; and (3) new detainees may conceal contraband.42  The Third 
Circuit believed “[t]here [was] no easy way to distinguish between 
juvenile and adult detainees in terms of the security risks cited by the 
Supreme Court in Florence.”43  While it acknowledged in passing that 
                                                                                                                       
 33 Id. (Specifically, J.B.’s parents asserted “various civil rights violations under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and 
violations of due process against various prison officials.”). 
 34 See id. 
 35 Id. at 338–39. 
 36 Id. at 339. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 342. 
 39 See id. at 344. 
 40 See id. at 337, 341, 344. 
 41 Id. at 342.  See infra Part III, Section B. 
 42 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d. at 342, 346.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 
U.S. 318, 330–33 (2012). 
 43 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 343. 
2018] Juveniles are Different 351 
“youth . . . is a . . . condition of life when a person may be most 
susceptible . . . to psychological damage . . . [c]hildren are especially 
susceptible to possible traumas from strip searches[,]”44 the Third Circuit 
found that the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring the facility is secure 
outweighs a juvenile detainee’s privacy interests.45  Juvenile detainees 
pose the same risks as those noted in Florence, which means that juvenile 
detainees may pose significant dangers to other detainees, detention center 
staff, and themselves.46 The Third Circuit held that a universal strip search 
of juvenile detainees before admission to the general population of a 
juvenile detention center serves legitimate penological interests.47 
The Third Circuit also reasoned that, unlike adult detainees, the state 
acts in loco parentis during a juvenile’s detention period;48 the 
individualized, reasonable suspicion inquiry is problematic;49 and 
Florence did not carve out an exception for juvenile detainees.50  The court 
first noted that juveniles are presumptively under the control of their 
parents; however, if that control falters, such as when juveniles are 
detained, the state assumes control over the juvenile, acting in loco 
parentis.51  In this situation, the state’s “enhanced responsibility to screen 
for signs of disease, self-mutilation, or abuse in the home” may outweigh 
the juvenile’s privacy interests.52 
Second, an individualized, reasonable suspicion standard is 
impractical because, as the Florence Court noted, correctional officers 
know little about the detainee during intake, and new detainees might lie 
about their identity.53  Because correctional officers have limited 
information, it is unreasonable for them to assume that the new detainee 
standing in front of them has not smuggled something into the facility.54 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged that 
“blanket policies in prison administration” are useful.55  During the intake 
                                                                                                                       
 44 Id. at 342 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (also acknowledging that strip 
searches are “a serious intrusion upon personal rights[,] an offense to the dignity of the 
individual[,] and demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, 
unpleasant, embarrassing, and repulsive[]”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 45 Id. at 344. 
 46 Id. at 342. 
 47 Id. at 340. 
 48 Id. at 343 (stating that “juveniles pose risks unique from those of adults[,]” thus 
implying that that the state’s in loco parentis role over the juvenile is the only thing 
distinguishing juvenile from adult detainees). 
 49 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 344–45. 
 50 Id. at 346. 
 51 See id. at 343 n.41. 
 52 See id. at 343–44 (internal citation omitted). 
 53 Id. at 344–45. 
 54 Id. at 345. 
 55 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 345. 
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process, it is almost impossible for a correctional officer to identify a 
detainee who has a propensity for “violence, escape, or drug smuggling.”56  
In addition, classifications based upon individualized assessment risk 
discriminatory application, for a correctional officer might strip search a 
detainee based on characteristics such as race, sex, age, or accent.57  
Alternatively, a correctional officer, in an effort to avoid liability, may 
decide not to conduct a strip search “in [a] close case” and expose the 
entire detention center population to unnecessary risk.58 
Finally, the Third Circuit determined that the Florence Court did not 
carve out “an exception for juvenile detainees.”59  When the Court stated 
it would not rule on whether other kinds of searches would be reasonable 
if a detainee is not admitted to the general population, it did not mean to 
imply that strip searches of juvenile detainees would provide an example 
of when other kinds of searches would be reasonable (i.e. strip searches 
would be unreasonable).60  Under the Third Circuit’s interpretation of 
Florence, any potential exceptions the Supreme Court may have carved 
out do not include exceptions based on age classifications.61  Correctional 
officers in any detention facility have an “‘essential interest in readily 
administrable rules[;]’”62 as a result, “blanket strip search policies upon 
admission to the general population of a jail, regardless of whether the 
detainee is a juvenile or adult, make good sense.”63 
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
A. School Searches and Individualized Suspicion 
In Safford United School District #1 v. Redding, the Supreme Court 
held that the strip search of a student violated the Fourth Amendment 
because it was unreasonable in its scope.64  Following a report from 
another student, the assistant principal asked thirteen-year-old Savana 
Redding if she knew anything about prescription and over-the-counter 
                                                                                                                       
 56 Id. at 345 (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 327 (2012)). 
 57 Id. at 345. 
 58 Id. at 346 (citing Florence, 566 U.S. at 337). 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. 
 61 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 346–47 (noting the Supreme Court used broad, sweeping 
language like “jail” to include “prisons and other detention facilities” and “every” and “all” 
when depicting who will be strip searched and therefore meant to include juveniles). 
 62 Id. at 346 (quoting Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001)). 
 63 Id. (citing Florence, 566 U.S. at 338). 
 64 557 U.S. 364, 368, 376–77 (2009). 
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pills, deemed contraband pursuant to school rules.65  Savana allowed the 
assistant principal and an administrative assistant to search her backpack, 
but they did not find any pills.66  The assistant then took Savana to the 
school nurse’s office to search her clothes for the alleged pills.67  After 
Savana removed her outer clothing and shoes, the assistant and nurse 
(“school officials”) told Savana to remove her pants and T-shirt.68  The 
school officials told Savana, who was standing in front of them in her bra 
and underpants, to “pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull 
out the elastic on her underpants . . . exposing her breasts and pelvic 
area[.]”69  The school officials did not find any pills.70 
The Supreme Court held that the strip search of Savana was 
unconstitutional because the “content of the suspicion,” that Savana was 
providing contraband pills to fellow students, “failed to match the degree 
of intrusion,” the strip search.71  Savana exposing “her breasts and pelvic 
area to some degree” to two school officials coupled with “subjective and 
reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy” warranted the 
conclusion that this kind of search was categorically distinct from “a 
search of outer clothing and belongings.”72  This kind of intrusive search, 
therefore, demanded that distinct elements be met before school 
authorities search a student in this manner.73  The Court reasoned that the 
test for searches of children by school officials was set forth in New Jersey 
v. T.L.O.74  The Supreme Court in T.L.O. held that a school official must 
have reasonable suspicion to search a student.75  When the “measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not 
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the 
nature of the infraction,” a school official’s search of a student is 
permissible.76 
Applying T.L.O., the Safford Court held that the assistant principal 
had a reasonable suspicion to search Savana’s backpack and outer 
                                                                                                                       
 65 See id. at 368 (The pills in question were “four white prescription-strength ibuprofen 
400-mg pills, and one over-the counter blue naproxen 200-mg pill, all used for pain and 
inflammation but banned under school rules without advance permission.”). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 369.  Both the administrative assistant and school nurse were women. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Safford, 557 U.S. at 369. 
 71 See id. at 375–77. 
 72 Id. at 374. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. at 370. 
 75 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985). 
 76 Safford, 557 U.S. at 370.  A “school search” is another way of referring to a school 
official’s search of a student. 
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clothing.77  The Court reasoned that based on the assistant principal’s prior 
conversations with two other students, the assistant principal could have 
reasonably suspected Savana of providing contraband pills to her fellow 
students, and it was reasonable for the assistant principal to suspect that 
Savana was carrying the pills on her person or in her backpack.78  The 
Court held that the search of Savana’s bag in the privacy of the assistant 
principal’s office, and the school nurse’s subsequent search of Savana’s 
outer clothing were not excessively intrusive.79  Nevertheless, the Court 
found that there was no indication of danger, and no reason to suppose that 
Savana was carrying pills in her underwear.80  In other words, for a school 
search to reasonably make the jump from a student’s outer clothes to 
intimate parts, there must be a reasonable suspicion of danger or that the 
student has resorted to hiding contraband in his or her underwear.81  The 
Court explained that reasonable suspicion is required before a strip search 
is performed because “[t]he meaning of such a search, and the degradation 
its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category 
of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.”82 
The Court noted its concerns about the potential psychological 
effects that an invasive search may have on adolescents.83  Savana clearly 
had a subjective expectation of privacy, for she described the strip search 
as “embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating.”84  Indeed, such a search 
is an affront to any adolescent’s sense of bodily integrity and dignity.  
Noting that adolescents feel this kind of invasion particularly acutely, the 
Court reasoned that Savana’s expectation of privacy was reasonable and 
consistent with experiences of other adolescents similarly searched 
“whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the 
exposure.”85  The Court held that the strip search was unreasonable, and 
that it violated Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights to privacy.86 
                                                                                                                       
 77 Id. at 373–74. 
 78 Id. at 371–74. 
 79 Id. at 374. 
 80 See id. at 376–77. 
 81 Id. at 377. 
 82 See Safford, 557 U.S. at 377. 
 83 See id. 375. 
 84 Id. at 374–75. 
 85 Id. at 375 (noting the important distinction between the bodily exposure Savana 
experienced during the search and the bodily exposure school students experience when, 
for example, changing for gym, and reasoning that changing “for play” has an entirely 
different meaning than a search “exposing the body” in response to an accusation of 
wrongdoing) (internal citations omitted). 
 86 Id. at 379. 
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B. Blanket Strip Search Policies in Adult Jails 
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Supreme Court held 
that a correctional facility may constitutionally impose a universal strip 
search policy on all detainees admitted to the general population.87  Albert 
Florence was arrested and subsequently detained at Burlington County 
Detention Center and Essex County Correctional Facility, both in New 
Jersey.88  Florence’s arrest stemmed from a traffic stop in which a state 
trooper observed that he had an outstanding bench warrant in the statewide 
computer database.89  The bench warrant was issued in 2003 when 
Florence fell behind on a fine’s monthly payments.90  While Florence paid 
the outstanding balance approximately one week after the warrant was 
issued, the warrant remained in the statewide computer database in error.91  
Prison officials at both facilities strip searched Florence during the intake 
process.92 
Florence challenged the strip searches at both facilities.93  Florence 
argued that if a new detainee was not arrested for a weapons or drugs 
offense, or a serious crime, correctional officers should not strip search 
that detainee.94  Non-violent detainees should be exempt from strip 
searches unless a correctional officer has “a particular reason to suspect” 
they are hiding contraband.95  Noting that the seriousness of an offense 
does not accurately predict which inmate has contraband, the Court 
rejected Florence’s argument.96 
The Court deferred to correctional officers’ expertise regarding 
necessary safety measures and reasoned that a universal strip search policy 
is reasonable unless there is “substantial evidence” suggesting the policy 
is an exaggerated response to the situation.97  The Court reasoned that three 
main risks justify a universal strip search policy in correctional facilities: 
(1) the “danger of introducing lice or contagious infections[;]” (2) “the 
increasing number of gang members who go through the intake process[;]” 
and (3) “contraband concealed by new detainees[.]”98  Contraband is 
anything “possessed in violation of prison rules,” and includes weapons, 
                                                                                                                       
 87 See 566 U.S. 318, 322–23 (2012). 
 88 Id. at 323. 
 89 See id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 323–24. 
 93 See Florence, 566 U.S. at 323–24. 
 94 Id. at 334. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See id. 
 97 Id. at 330 (internal quotations and citation omitted).  The Court did not explicitly 
define “substantial evidence”. 
 98 See id. at 330–33. 
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drugs, alcohol, knives, razor blades, scissors, glass shards, crack, heroin, 
marijuana, lighters, matches, and even “an overlooked pen.”99  
Correctional officers’ professional expertise allows them to create and 
implement reasonable search policies to detect and prevent the possession 
of these items in their facilities, and determine whether a universal strip 
search policy is “reasonably related to legitimate security interests.”100 
The Court noted that because those arrested for minor offenses may 
still smuggle contraband, or those not subject to strip searches may be 
coerced into smuggling contraband into the jail, it is impractical to require 
correctional officers to make an individualized assessment during the 
intake process, as they usually know very little about the new detainee’s 
history.101  In addition, “during the pressures of the intake process[,]” most 
correctional officers are ill suited to make quick determinations that an 
inmate’s underlying offenses warrant a strip search.102  Because jails are 
dangerous places, where admitting new inmates creates various risks for 
existing inmates, facility staff, and the new inmate, correctional officers 
have a legitimate security interest in conducting a thorough search of the 
new inmate “as a standard part of the intake process.”103  As a result, the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require correctional officers to 
have reasonable suspicion that a detainee is smuggling contraband, before 
conducting a strip search.104  While the Court left open the possibility for 
an exception to a universal strip search policy, such as when a detainee is 
not admitted to the general population and does not have significant 
contact with other detainees, it never addressed whether its holding would 
apply to juvenile detainees held in juvenile detention centers.105 
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT INCORRECTLY DECIDED J.B. V. FASSNACHT 
Despite acknowledging that juveniles are especially susceptible to 
psychological damage from the trauma of a strip search, the Third Circuit 
nevertheless found that the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
facility is secure outweighs a juvenile detainee’s privacy interests.106  
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While this may be true for adult facilities, a juvenile correctional facility 
needs a more specific reason for conducting a full body-cavity inspection 
of a juvenile detainee.  Juvenile privacy rights outweigh a facility’s 
legitimate interests in prison management because juveniles are more 
psychologically and developmentally fragile, and because they do not 
present the same institutional security risks as adult inmates.  As such, the 
standard provided in Safford v. Redding should govern.  Before conducting 
a strip search, a correctional official must have individualized, reasonable 
suspicion that a juvenile detainee is dangerous or hiding contraband. 
A. The Third Circuit did not Meaningfully Consider Psychological and 
Developmental Factors that Distinguish Juveniles from Adults 
i. Adolescent Psychological Development 
“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.”107  Research of brain 
development and function proves that juveniles are different from 
adults.108  For example, the “Dual Systems Model” of adolescent brain 
development suggests that adolescents might experience a temporal gap in 
brain development.109  Specifically, portions of the brain linked to puberty 
and reward seeking behavior mature early, causing risky behavior to peak 
during “middle adolescence,” whereas areas of the brain responsible for 
restraint, judgment, and planning are not fully mature until the mid-
twenties.110  This explains why adolescents are immature, impulsive, and 
often reckless.111   Adolescents are also more vulnerable to peer 
influence than adults.112  Desire for peer approval and fear of rejection 
often cause adolescents to engage in antisocial behavior, especially around 
age fourteen or fifteen, to “impress their friends or to conform to peer 
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expectations.”113  The importance of peer approval in adolescence is 
especially prominent in group situations and a major reason why 
adolescents, more so than adults, commit crimes in groups.114  During this 
phase of immaturity, adolescents are “in the process of separating from 
their parents and forming their adult personal identities, a process that 
involves exploration and . . . experimentation in risky activities”; as a 
result, adolescent criminal activity is often a result of experimentation, or 
testing limits, in contrast to adult criminal activity, which reflects 
“individual preferences and values.”115  This suggests that juvenile crime 
is psychologically different than adult crime. 
Due to their developmental immaturity, adolescents are also more 
vulnerable to coercive circumstances and are less able to respond 
appropriately to external pressures adults could resist.116  For example, 
juveniles are developmentally disadvantaged in police-citizen 
encounters.117  As decision makers, juveniles are less able to advocate for 
themselves when confronted by “older and much more socially and 
politically dominating authority, such as a police officer.”118  Adolescents 
have little “real-world” experience, and due to their “present-oriented 
thinking, egocentrism, [and] greater conformity to authority figures,” they 
are more vulnerable to stress and fear, which means that what an adult 
perceives as a benign street encounter with a police officer, an adolescent 
is more likely to feel that his or her freedom is limited.119  In addition, since 
adolescents are impulsive, they may respond to perceived threats more 
aggressively or emotionally than adults.120 
During adolescence, privacy becomes increasingly important.121  As 
puberty begins, adolescents begin to make “thorough assessment[s]” of 
themselves.122  During this time of “critical self-appraisal[,]” adolescents 
are more self-conscious and more vulnerable to embarrassment than their 
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adult counterparts.123  The vulnerability and sensitivity juveniles have 
regarding their bodies and interactions with authority figures suggest that 
a strip search upon intake to a detention facility will be very traumatic.  
Indeed, juveniles may feel like they are being sexually assaulted during a 
strip search and may be “retraumatize[d]” if they are already suffering 
from a psychiatric disorder or PTSD.124 
ii. The Third Circuit Ignored Supreme Court Precedent Finding Age 
to be a Determinative Factor in Accessing Culpability 
In three significant cases, Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and 
Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court relied on psychological and 
developmental data and found that age was a determinative factor in 
assessing juvenile culpability at sentencing.125  While these cases address 
juvenile culpability, the evidence the Court relies on in each decision is 
equally applicable to juvenile vulnerability.126  A juvenile offender’s 
developmental immaturity, impulsivity, susceptibility to peer pressure, 
and insecurity is the same whether the juvenile is being housed at a 
detention center pre-trial, or standing before a judge at sentencing. 
In 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment forbids imposing the 
death penalty upon juvenile offenders under eighteen years old.127  
Significantly, the Court provided three reasons why—psychologically and 
developmentally—juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult 
offenders.128  First, juveniles tend to lack maturity and have an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, as compared to adults.129  
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Statistically, adolescents are the most reckless out of any age group.130  
Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”131  The Court 
noted that youth is not simply a chronological fact, but “a time and 
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and 
to psychological damage[.]”132  Finally, juvenile character traits are 
considered temporary, and not fully formed.133 
The Court also noted that the two social purposes of the death 
penalty—retribution and deterrence—do not provide a sufficient 
justification for imposing it upon juvenile offenders.134  Because a 
juvenile’s culpability or blameworthiness, due to youth and immaturity is 
diminished, the argument for retribution is not as strong as with an adult 
offender.135  As for deterrence, juveniles are less likely than adults to make 
a “cost-benefit analysis” before engaging in criminal conduct; as a result, 
the possibility of execution does not factor into their decision making.136 
Five years after Roper, the Supreme Court held that a sentence of life 
without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment when imposed on juveniles who commit a non-
homicide offense.137  Similar to Roper, the Court in Graham v. Florida 
reasoned that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to 
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”138  
Indeed, research indicated that sections of the brain that regulate behavior 
control are still developing in late adolescence.139  The Court 
reemphasized Roper’s holding that because juvenile offenders are less 
culpable, they are also less deserving of the most serious kinds of 
punishment.140  The Court continued, “‘[f]rom a moral standpoint it would 
be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult[.]’”141 
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In 2012, the Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole 
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.142  Pointing to its 
prior decisions in Roper and Graham, the Court in Miller v. Alabama 
reiterated that “children are different” from adults.143 Moreover, because 
juveniles are less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults, 
they are “‘less deserving of the most severe punishments.’”144  In that 
regard, criminal procedure laws that ignore defendants’ youthfulness are 
flawed.145  The Court even opined that “it is the odd legal rule that does 
not have some form of exception for children.”146 
B. The Third Circuit Failed to Treat Juveniles Differently when it Found 
that Risks and Dangers at Juvenile Detention Facilities were the Same as 
Adult Jails 
The Third Circuit found that the three institutional security risks that 
the Florence Court identified with respect to adult facilities also applied 
to juvenile detention facilities.147  A juvenile detention facility can 
implement a universal strip search policy because (1) new detainees could 
introduce lice or contagious infections to the general population; (2) an 
increased number of gang members going through the intake process 
increases the likelihood of violence in the facility; and (3) new detainees 
may conceal contraband.148  The Third Circuit stated, 
There is no easy way to distinguish between juvenile and adult detainees in 
terms of the security risks cited by the Supreme Court in Florence. Indeed, 
[a] detention center, police station, or jail holding cell is a place fraught with 
serious security dangers. These security dangers to the institution are the same 
whether the detainee is a juvenile or an adult.149 
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If “[juveniles] are different,”150 then juvenile and adult detainee 
security risks are also different.  This is consistent with American laws and 
judicial precedent and demonstrates that juveniles “cannot be viewed 
simply as miniature adults.”151  It is therefore incorrect to conclude 
security dangers at correctional facilities are the same whether the detainee 
is a juvenile or adult. 
Adult jails house significantly more detainees than juvenile facilities.  
The security risks at adult jails are ordinarily much greater.152  For 
example, the Essex County Jail, where Florence was detained, is the 
largest county jail in New Jersey.153  Essex County Jail admits more than 
25,000 inmates annually and houses approximately “1,000 gang members 
at any given time.”154  In 2014, when J.B.’s case was pending before the 
District Court, 56% of juvenile facilities in the United States housed 
twenty or fewer residents.155  Only twenty-two of 1,852 (or 1%) juvenile 
facilities in the United States house 200 or more residents.156  This means 
that at any given time, an adult facility like Essex County Jail is housing 
five times as many detainees as one of the largest juvenile facilities, not 
including the non-gang member detainees. 
In 2015, LCYIC, where J.B. was detained, has a Detention program, 
a Shelter program, and a “P.U.L.S.E. Weekend Program,” with a 60-bed 
capacity, 24-bed capacity, and 12-bed capacity, respectively.157  Forty-five 
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juveniles were held in the facility on December 31, 2015.158  In total, 532 
juveniles were admitted to the facility in 2015.159  This yearly total is less 
than half the population of Essex County Jail on any given day. A 
categorical rule requiring universal strip searches at a facility like Essex 
County Jail makes sense; however, a juvenile facility like LCYIC or even 
a facility housing 200 juveniles cannot take the administratively easy way 
out.  Common sense dictates that a facility housing more than 1,000 adults 
is going to have a greater security risk than a facility housing forty-five 
juveniles ages ten through eighteen.160  A facility like Essex County jail is 
undoubtedly going to have greater security risks than a juvenile facility 
like LCYIC, because in larger facilities, “violence levels are higher, staff-
inmate relationships are more impersonal, and the organizational structure 
is more rigid.”161  If a strip search of a juvenile detainee is going to occur, 
it must be based on individualized, reasonable suspicion that the juvenile 
is dangerous or smuggling contraband. 
Moreover, juvenile facilities generally provide more programs and 
offer a more rehabilitative setting than adult facilities.162  Many juvenile 
facilities have a ratio of about one teacher per fifteen juveniles, and 
juveniles at a facility in Florida, for example, have “academic classes, 
skills training, counseling, and recreational activities” on a daily basis.163  
In addition, self-report studies discovered that juveniles in juvenile 
facilities have higher positive attitudes than juveniles housed in adult 
facilities.164  This too may indicate that security threats at juvenile facilities 
are not as high as the Third Circuit suggests. 
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V. AN INDIVIDUALIZED, REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD 
COMPORTS WITH TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES 
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Requirement of Individualized, 
Reasonable Suspicion 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and effects[.]”165  The Supreme Court 
often begins with the presumption that a government official must have a 
warrant supported by probable cause to conduct a search.166  Probable 
cause exists when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence 
of a crime will be found” in the area searched.167  The requirement of a 
warrant supported by probable cause, however, is at a best a default rule, 
for the Supreme Court has enumerated several exceptions to the probable 
cause and warrant requirement.  These exceptions include exigent 
circumstances,168 searches incident to arrest,169 consent searches,170 
automobile and container searches,171 plain view searches,172 stop and frisk 
searches,173 and administrative searches.174  In practice, these exceptions 
outnumber searches pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause. In 
some situations, such as the strip search of a juvenile detainee, though the 
search lacks a warrant, the requirement of individualized, reasonable 
suspicion is the proper default rule. 
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that when a police officer 
has reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
person[] with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,” 
he may conduct a limited search of that person’s outer clothing, also 
known as a “frisk,” in order to find any weapons which might jeopardize 
his safety.175  The purpose of the Terry stop and frisk exception is police 
officer and community safety.176  The Supreme Court reasoned that an 
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officer must be able to search a potentially armed and dangerous individual 
to protect himself and other potential victims of violence, even if that 
officer lacks probable cause to arrest that individual.177 The Court noted 
that “[t]he scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”178  Therefore, the 
officer must limit his search of the individual to areas where a weapon may 
be hidden.179 
The Supreme Court echoed its reasoning in Terry when it required 
school officials to possess some individualized, reasonable suspicion prior 
to searching a student.180 In Safford, for example, the Supreme Court found 
that the “content of the suspicion” must match “the degree of intrusion.”181  
Furthermore, the school official must possess a reasonable suspicion that 
the hidden contraband poses a danger to other students, or in the words of 
the Terry Court, “other prospective victims of violence.”182 
These cases demonstrate that implicit in the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is the principle that 
a government official must have probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
prior to searching an individual.  At the very least, a government official 
must have some reason to suspect an individual of wrongdoing before 
searching that individual’s person or effects. 
B. Administrative Searches 
Another string of cases in which the Supreme Court carved out an 
exception to the probable cause and warrant requirement are 
administrative searches.  Rather than look to whether a government 
official possesses probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the Supreme 
Court conducts a balancing test in which it weighs “[an] individual’s 
legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security” against “the 
government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public 
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order.”183  Administrative searches depart from traditional Fourth 
Amendment principles, because the primary concern in these situations is 
whether the government is “reasonably pursuing a legitimate government 
interest.”184  If the government is pursuing a legitimate interest, the 
requirement of probable cause, and possibly reasonable suspicion, 
requirements vanishes.185 
Border searches are a form of administrative search.186  In United 
States v. Flores-Montano, the Supreme Court found that the government’s 
legitimate interest “in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and 
effects is at its zenith at the international border.”187  A sovereign’s 
longstanding right to protect itself gives government officials authority to 
conduct suspicionless searches at its borders, which can include 
disassembling and reassembling a car’s fuel tank to search for 
contraband.188  In this context, the government’s interest in protecting 
international borders outweighs the individual’s possessory interest.189 
The Supreme Court has also used the balancing test to hold that DNA 
buccal swabs of every individual arrested for burglary or a crime of 
violence serves a legitimate government interest of identifying dangerous 
individuals, individuals who might flee, or individuals who were 
wrongfully convicted.190  The Supreme Court in Maryland v. King noted 
that the government interest must outweigh the invasiveness of the 
search.191  In this case, that balancing test was satisfied because the 
government interest in identifying arrestees was great while the intrusion 
was minimal.192  In addition, the DNA data collected from the buccal swab 
merely provided identification, as it did not reveal the arrestee’s genetic 
traits.193 
Sobriety checkpoints offer another example of an administrative 
search in which no reasonable suspicion is required.194  Instead, police 
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officers stop all vehicles, then examine the driver for signs of 
intoxication.195  If the officer observes signs of intoxication, he or she may 
conduct additional sobriety tests.196  In this context, the Supreme Court has 
found that the state’s interest in eradicating drunk driving outweighs the 
minimal intrusion imposed on motorists during the brief stop.197 
In a similar fashion, the government may impose a uniform drug 
testing policy on customs officials who carry firearms and are involved in 
drug interdiction.198  The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he Customs 
Service is our Nation’s first line of defense” against illicit drug smuggling 
which affects “the health and welfare of our population.”199  In this 
context, the national interest of protecting international borders outweighs 
the interference with individual liberty, caused by submitting to a 
urinalysis test.200 
These cases demonstrate that administrative searches implicitly seek 
to protect against a danger that would have widespread consequences. The 
government interest in protecting public roads and international borders 
justifies a search of personal belongings such as a car fuel tank, or a search 
of an individual, such as swabbing the inside of his or her mouth to obtain 
a DNA sample, asking him or her to submit to a sobriety test, or requiring 
him to submit a urine sample.  Though inconvenient, the physical intrusion 
caused by administrative searches is minimal, certainly much less invasive 
than a strip search, which exposes “intimate parts.”201 
C. The Individualized Suspicion Standard Provided in Safford United 
School District #1 v. Redding Should Govern Strip Searches of Juvenile 
Detainees 
When determining whether an invasive search of the body is 
appropriate, the most important factor to consider is who is being searched 
and why, not where they are being searched.  In other words, while it may 
be easier to find that Florence governs juvenile detention center strip 
searches because Florence addresses detainee treatment, the line should 
not be drawn at “detention center,” rather, it should be drawn at “juvenile.”  
Juveniles have been, and should continue to be treated differently than 
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adults.  In Safford, the Supreme Court found that a school official must 
have reasonable suspicion of danger or that a student is hiding contraband 
in his or her underwear, before strip searching that student.202  Without 
such reasonable suspicion, an invasive search is unconstitutional.203  A 
strip search is categorically distinct from a search of a student’s backpack 
or outer clothing because it invades “subjective and reasonable societal 
expectations of personal privacy” by exposing intimate parts and causing 
embarrassment, fright, and humiliation.204  Under the Safford Court’s 
reasoning, a strip search “require[es] distinct elements of justification on 
the part of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing 
and belongings.”205  Those distinct elements are a reasonable belief under 
the circumstances that there is danger or that student has resorted to hiding 
contraband in his or her underwear.206  This is the proper standard that 
should be applied in the juvenile detention center context. 
Applying Safford’s standard, the concerns articulated by the Third 
Circuit in J.B. v. Fassnacht, that correctional officials must be able to 
check for lice or contagious infections, gang symbols or tattoos, and signs 
of “self-mutilation or abuse in the home,” do not necessitate the degree of 
intrusion that a strip search entails.207 Certainly, correctional officials can 
detect lice and gang tattoos through a less invasive search, and if the 
juvenile detention center is concerned with self-mutilation or abuse in the 
home, surely a medical or psychological exam would better reveal those 
issues than a strip search upon intake. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit agreed that because a strip search creates a 
“substantial risk of psychological damage for juvenile 
detainees . . . juvenile[s] maintain[] an enhanced right to privacy.”208  Still, 
the Third Circuit found, paradoxically, that in a detention center setting, 
juveniles present the same risks and dangers as adults; therefore, a blanket 
strip search policy at a juvenile detention center is constitutionally 
permissible.209  Moreover, the Third Circuit failed to meaningfully 
consider the psychological and developmental differences between 
juveniles and adults.  Those differences do not disappear simply because 
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a juvenile is detained or has committed a crime, and it is morally 
misguided “‘to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a 
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be 
reformed.’”210  Juveniles are different, and if a detention center is going to 
strip search a juvenile, there must be an individualized, reasonable 
suspicion that the juvenile is dangerous or smuggling contraband.  Not 
only does a requirement of individualized, reasonable suspicion take into 
account that juveniles are psychologically and developmentally different 
than adults, but it comports with traditional Fourth Amendment principles 
that require a government official to have some level of suspicion of 
wrongdoing prior to searching an individual. 
The mere fact of a juvenile’s admission to a juvenile detention center 
is not enough to justify a blanket strip search policy because the safety 
risks are not the same as those in an adult facility, and the concerns 
expressed by the Third Circuit, or the “content of suspicion” simply do not 
match the intrusiveness of a strip search.   As the Supreme Court noted, “it 
is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for 
children.”211  Whether it is at sentencing, or during pretrial detention, legal 
rules, including strip search polices, must take into account that juveniles 
are different. 
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